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ing. However, these studies were based on competitive market models, and Chern and Just argued forcefully that the industry's response to mechanical harvesting indicated oligopsony behavior by processors.
Kim et al. subsequently tried to adapt the results from Brandt and French's econometric analysis to the oligopsony structure indicated by Chern and Just. Their study is apparently the first to adopt formally a model of imperfect competition in considering the welfare effects of an innovation. However, little further progress has been made on incorporating imperfect competition into analyses of returns to research, innovation, and technology adoption. Rather, emphasis has remained on the competitive model. Alston, Norton, and Pardey have carefully compiled and synthesized this work.
Recent attempts to incorporate imperfect competition into the analysis of returns to research include a study by Voon, who used simulations to compare results for monopoly versus perfect competition, and a study by Dryburgh and Doyle, who examined the impact of technology change in the British dairy industry under alternative scenarios of monopoly, monopsony, and perfect competition. These analyses indicate the importance of market structure both to the magnitude and distribution of research benefits. However, they do not evaluate the actual market behavior and conduct tests for alternative market outcomes. They rely instead on comparing alternative extreme forms of market structure such as monopoly and monopsony versus perfect competition. In contrast this study adopts a conjectural variations oligopoly-oligopsony model that admits monopoly/monopsony and perfect competition as special cases, tests empirically for the presence of market power, and applies the methodology in a real problem setting.'
The Model
This section formulates the supply and demand relationships for the Taiwanese processing tomato industry. Taiwanese tomato processors generally also produce other food products such as asparagus, bamboo shoots, mushrooms, and various fruits, so the analysis employs a multiproduct cost-function framework based upon the work of Wann and Sexton. The various nontomato products generally have similar processing methods and use common canning equipment. However, the major tomato products, tomato paste and puree, require distinct treatments for crushing, heating, juicing, filtering, and evaporating. We therefore considered two product composites: tomato products and other products.
Processors were assumed to employ a quasi fixed-proportions technology wherein substitution between the raw agricultural input and the processing inputs-labor, energy, and capitalis prohibited, but substitution among the processing inputs is possible.2 In the cost function derived from this technology, raw product costs are separable from processing costs, and processor behavior can be represented in terms of marketing margins.
The model consists of the following components: (i) processors' cost function and associated demand functions for processing inputs, (ii) marketing margin equations which characterize processor behavior in the procurement of raw product and sale of processed products, (iii) farm supply of raw products, and (iv) domestic demand for processed products. Taiwanese processors are assumed to be perfect competitors in export sales.3 A representative tomato processor's profit function can be expressed as where FiD (QiD) denotes the inverse domestic demand curve for tomato products (i = 1) and other processed foods (i = 2); QfD denotes aggregate quantity supplied to the domestic market for product composite i; qDP is the representative processor's domestic market sales of product i; iE is the parametric export price for the product composite i; qiE is the export sales of each product form for the representative processor; W,(R,) denotes the inverse supply curve facing processors for raw product i; Ri denotes aggregate purchases of raw product i; ri is the purchase level of raw product i by the represen-tative processor; C(.) is the processing cost function, q, = qfD+ q1, q2 qD+ q2E; and V1, V2, and V3, respectively, are the prices for processing inputs labor, capital, and energy. Maximization of equation (1) is subject to the constraint of the quasi fixed-proportions technology which requires that qi = airi, where aoi denotes the fixed rate at which raw product form i is converted into processed product. Substituting these constraints into equation (1) enables the optimization problem to be expressed in terms of the volumes of raw product riE and rD, i = 1, 2, allocated to the export and domestic markets, respectively. The first-order conditions for maximization of equation (1) The first-order conditions can also be expressed in terms of the Lerner index, i.e., the relative markdown in the raw product market and markup in the output market: The key parameters for purposes of measuring and testing for market power are 0, and 5i-These terms, sometimes known as "conjectural elasticities," range in the unit interval, with values of zero denoting perfectly competitive behavior (i.e., the firm perceives that its actions have no impact on the market) and values of 1.0 representing monopoly or monopsony behavior. The parameters 0i and 4i thus represent convenient indices to measure behavior in the raw product and processed product markets, respectively.
Export sales in this model play the role of the competitive "benchmark" product in the WannSexton methodology. Markups of domestic prices from export prices are used to measure departures from competition for domestic product sales. Similarly, markdowns of the rawproduct price from the export price, after adjusting for processing costs, measure processors' oligopsony power in raw-product procurement.
Without further loss of generality, we choose units of measurement for raw and processed products so that a = 1.0. One final re-expression of the first-order conditions will be useful in the subsequent comparison of welfare effects under perfect versus imperfect competition. Following Quirmbach, the market behavior parameter 0 can be interpreted as a weight in expressing net export price, PE -C, as a linear combination of average and marginal raw-product costs facing the industry. Similarly, 4 can be interpreted as a weight in expressing PE as a linear combination of average and marginal revenues facing the industry in the domestic market: To develop an estimable model, functional specifications must be chosen for the processing cost function, raw-product supply functions, and processed-product demand functions. Studies of various flexible cost functions have indicated the generally superior performance of the generalized Leontief (GL) when substitution among inputs is limited (Guilkey, Lovell, and Sickles). This consideration supports adoption of the GL cost function in studies of food processing. A further advantage is that the GL more readily accommodates zero output levels and admits a more convenient expression of marginal costs than, for example, the translog.
The multiproduct GL cost function can be expressed as Huang This version of the GL satisfies homogeneity of degree one in both input prices and outputs by construction. The marginal processing cost functions, C, and C2, indicated in equations (2) and ( 
Application to the Taiwanese Processing Tomato Industry
The processing tomato industry in Taiwan has traditionally been export oriented, with major exports including paste, puree, ketchup, juice, and canned tomatoes. However, the domestic market has become increasingly important, and in 1992, for the first time, domestic sales measured in raw-product-equivalent volume exceeded 50% of export sales. The major tomato products consumed domestically in Taiwan are ketchup and tomato juice. Introduction of the mechanical harvester was considered as a means to revitalize the industry's declining export sales. Several factors suggest the possible importance of market power in Taiwanese tomato processing. First, the number of Taiwanese firms processing tomato products has declined from twenty-seven to five from 1984 to 1993. The percentage of the tomato harvest purchased by the four largest firms rose throughout this period, with an average of 59%.
Second, processing tomato production in Taiwan takes place on small farms-the average size in 1990 was only 0.27 ha-and the contracting process does not appear favorable to farmers. Contracting is conducted exclusively through representatives selected by processors, and growers have no organized bargaining group to support them. Descriptions of the contracting process by industry analysts such as Lai and Hsu also suggest its possible use to facilitate the exercise of oligopsony power by processors. It is argued, for example, that assignment of tomatoes to various grades is used as a tool to manipulate price, and provisions limiting processors' purchase obligations are August 1996 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
used as instruments of supply control. Interviews conducted in the present study suggest that contract prices are set at a meeting of the largest processing firms, with other processors subsequently adopting that price schedule.7 Finally, tariffs are a major factor supporting processor oligopoly power in the domestic sales of processed tomato products. Tariffs were in the 50%-75% range in the early 1980s and have declined subsequently to the range of 17.5%-45% in 1992, depending upon product form. Comparisons of domestic versus export prices for comparable tomato products provide preliminary evidence of processor power in the domestic market.8
The complete model to be estimated consists of equations (2), (3'), (4'), (5), (6), and (7). In principle, the model may be estimated as a full system. In practice, however, the full system has proven difficult to estimate and, moreover, is very demanding of data resources. In the present study, as in related previous work (see Wann and Sexton for a discussion and references), both considerations led to simplifications for empirical purposes of the theoretical model. First, equations describing processing firms' buying and selling behavior with respect to the nontomato product composites were not estimated. These products were ancillary to the purpose of the study, and we lacked reliable data on both the raw product values and output prices.
Data limitations further required that the raw tomato supply function, processed tomato product demand function, and processor margin equation in domestic tomato product sales [equations (6), (7), and (3'), respectively] be estimated separately from the rest of the system. These functions were estimated from annual time-series data for 1980-90, while the processing cost function, input demand functions, and export marketing margin were estimated from pooled time-series, cross-section data for 1986-90.
Estimates of equations (6) and (7) Use of equation (3') to estimate oligopoly power in domestic tomato-product sales is appropriate only if the tomato-product mixes sold in the export and domestic markets are the same. This condition is not met in the present application because export sales focus on paste and puree, while most domestic sales are for ketchup and juice." Because marginal processing costs for domestic versus export sales may not be equal, it is inappropriate to treat the composite export price as a benchmark to 7 Antitrust laws did not exist in Taiwan until 1991, and it is not known whether this type of cooperative price-setting behavior will now be subject to challenge under these laws.
' Interviews with processors suggest that tomato products that are exported are of similar quality to those sold on the domestic market, eliminating quality differentials as an explanation for the price difference.
9 Endogeneity of price variables is a possible concern when the raw-tomato supply function and processed-product demand function are estimated separately from the system of equations describing processor behavior. The tomato contracting process described previously provides a strong theoretical basis to treat W, as exogenous (see Chern, p. 212). To test for endogeneity of pD, the demand equation was re-estimated using two-stage least squares. These estimates were very similar to the OLS results, and a Hausman test failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of poD 10 Huang reports the results of Box-Cox tests on the functional form of the raw-product supply and processed-product demand equations. The tests support use of the log linear form relative to the linear form, although estimated elasticities are similar for the two models. Given that the data do not exclude use of the log linear forms, they are preferred for this type of analysis because they yield constant elasticities.
" Reformulating the theoretical model to express domestic versus export sales as different product composites is not useful in solving the empirical problem because processors do not separate production costs by either product form or market outlet (i.e., domestic versus export). evaluate processor behavior in the domestic market. The approach undertaken to address this problem was to examine processor behavior in the output market for only ketchup and tomato juice, the two product forms with substantial sales in both the domestic and export markets.
Equation ( The system based on equations (2), (4'), and (5) was estimated using pooled data for 1986-90. This period was chosen because it provided the most complete and reliable data.13 Data were obtained for six tomato-processing firms. Among firms involved in tomato processing, these firms were chosen because their product mix consisted mainly of canned fruits and vegetables and because their sales were directed primarily to the export market. This choice of sample thus obviates the problems caused by product mixes differing between domestic and export sales and firms' failure to distinguish costs by product form.
The data for 1986 are from Taiwan's economic census, while the data for 1987-90 are from confidential factory surveys conducted by Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEA). Firms' processed outputs were assembled into tomato and other processed foods composites, with tomato products measured in standardized cases (farm weight equivalents). Other foods were measured in terms of actual cases sold. Tomato export prices were obtained by dividing the annual export value of paste and puree sales by the volume of exports in standardized cases. The estimated value of cans was then subtracted from this gross price because the MEA data on costs for cans and packaging material were unsatisfactory and, hence, not used.14 The farm price for raw tomatoes was the first-grade price for each contract year plus estimated average hauling costs, which are paid by processors. The first-grade price was used because communications with farmer representatives indicated that upwards of 80% of the crop was assigned this grade.
Processing labor costs were measured by the same factory wage variable, V,, used in estimating the tomato supply function. The quantity V, was divided into each firm's total labor expense to obtain annual labor hours. Energy costs, V3, were represented by the fuel and electricity wholesale price index which was divided into energy expenses to obtain volumes of energy utilized. Capital assets were grouped into building, equipment, and vehicle categories. A unit of capital capacity was defined as that needed to produce one standardized case of tomato products per hour. A capital price and quantity series were obtained for each category and then merged together utilizing procedures similar to those outlined in Sexton, Wilson, and Wann.'5
In conducting the system estimation, additive 12 The result that ketchup sales have been less competitive than juice sales is consistent with the structure of the industry. The dominant processor has maintained a larger market share in ketchup sales than in juice. In 1991 six firms sold juice domestically, while only four sold ketchup. '~ This period was also marked by relative stability in the industry. The four-firm concentration ratio trended slowly upward during the period but no major exogenous shocks were experienced. 14 This step implicitly requires the assumption that can and packaging costs are separable from other processing costs, which, in turn, implies the rather reasonable assumption that other processing inputs (labor, energy, and capital) cannot substitute for cans and packaging material in the production process. This same procedure was used to handle "miscellaneous expenses" contained in the MEA factory data.
15 See Huang for detailed discussion of data sources and variable construction, including appendix tables of the actual data except for those firm-level data obtained in confidence. Summary statistics of the confidential data are provided in Among the cost-function properties, the GL satisfies homogeneity of degree one in input prices by construction. Monotonicity in input prices was satisfied by the estimated function at all data points. However, concavity in input prices was not satisfied at all data points. This outcome may be a consequence of limited substitution among inputs in the food-processing technology. For example, a pure Leontief technology is affine in input prices and, as such, not strictly concave. In any event, failure to meet the concavity restriction is a limitation of the estimated model, as is the relatively limited sample size used in the estimation.'7 These factors need to be considered along with the positive aspects, such as high proportion of significant coefficients, use of micro versus aggregate data, and stability of results with respect to starting values, in evaluating conclusions based on the model. The key parameter from the system estimation is 0. Its estimated value of 0.98 is rather close to the theoretical monopsony value of 1.0. The hypothesis of monopsony, 0 = 1.0, is not rejected, but the hypothesis of competition, 0 = 0, is soundly rejected. This result indicates highly collusive conduct among processors in procuring tomatoes and is quite consistent with the information presented earlier on the contracting process.
From equation (2'), the estimation results can be used to decompose the export value of to- Thus, 13% of the export value of processing tomatoes was estimated to be due to processor monopsony power. Interesting to note is that, although processors' relative market power in raw-product procurement is considerably greater than their power in domestic processed-product sales, the consequence of that power is less in the input market than in the output market. The reason for this is the greater elasticity of supply of the raw product relative to the elasticity of demand for the processed product, which prevents even perfectly colluding oligopsonists from driving price too much below the competitive level.
Analysis of Returns to Mechanical Tomato Harvesting
We develop a partial equilibrium framework to evaluate the impacts of a cost-reducing innovation. In our application, events in the Taiwanese processing-tomato industry are unlikely to have significant spillover effects on other industries that would necessitate a general equilibrium approach.'" The stakeholders in the industry are assumed to be consumers, farmers, and processors. Farm input suppliers are not considered as an independent group of stakeholders in this application because the major input in tomato production, labor, is supplied primarily by the farm families.19
Welfare Analysis Methodology
The key component to welfare analysis of a cost-reducing innovation is estimation of the supply curve shift associated with the cost reductions. In an ex post analysis, the supply curve shift may be estimated econometrically.
In this ex ante analysis it was imputed from the results of government field trials. Given the estimated market behavior and the supply curve shift, new equilibrium values for prices and output can be derived. Per conventional practice, consumer and producer welfare effects were measured via changes in economic surplus. Processor welfare was measured as the change in profits induced by mechanical harvesting. Considerable discussion has evolved over how to model the supply curve shift, with divergent, parallel, and convergent shifts having been considered (Lindner and Jarrett). The nature of the supply curve shift is important, in general, for the measurement of producer surplus. But in models of imperfect competition it takes on added significance due to the implications for producers' elasticity of supply, which plays a key role in determining markdowns due to monopsony power. Alston, Norton, and Pardey argue that neither economic theory nor econometric estimation is likely to be very informative on the resolution of this issue, and they recommend, in the absence of strong contrary evidence, the use of a parallel shift.20 In the previous work on adoption of the tomato harvester in California, Brandt and French estimated a parallel supply curve shift which was also adopted in the subsequent work of Kim et al. Schmitz and Seckler did not estimate a supply curve, but a parallel shift is implicit in their analysis. Chern and Just, however, argued for a convergent supply curve shift because mechanical harvesting replaced a variable cost (harvest labor) with a fixed cost (the harvester). The Chern and Just argument for a convergent shift is less relevant in Taiwan because mechanical harvesting would be performed on a custom basis due to small farm sizes and would represent a variable rather than a fixed cost to farmers. We proceed, therefore, to develop the analysis with a parallel shift in the raw-tomato supply curve. 21 We use the interpretation of the market behavior parameters given in equations (2") and (3"') to provide a graphical depiction in figure  1 of the benefits to a cost-reducing innovation under imperfect competition and to compare the relative change in benefits under market power versus perfect competition. The market is depicted at the farm level.22 Henceforth, to ease the notational burden, subscripts 1 and 2 denoting tomato versus other processed products are omitted, and all prices and outputs are understood to refer to tomatoes. For graphical convenience, we use linear approximations of the derived demand and farm supply curves and set 0 = 4 = 0.5. Hence, the curve defined by (2") lies midway between the inverse supply curve Wo(R) and the associated marginal cost curve MCo(R), and the curve defined by (3"') lies midway between the inverse demand curve P(R) and the associated marginal revenue curve
MR(R).23
The initial competitive equilibrium is given by ( Pc = Wc, Rc) and the initial oligopoly-oligopsony equilibrium is given by ( Pm, Wom, Rom).
The cost-reducing innovation is assumed to shift farm supply to W'(R). Production increases to R, and price decreases to W(c = pc under perfect competition. The expansion in raw product input and processed product output In static market models, the social loss or reduction in total economic surplus from monopoly/monopsony power is the deadweight loss (DWL) caused by the restriction in inputs purchased and/or output supplied relative to perfect competition. The difference in benefits from a cost-reducing innovation under imperfect versus perfect competition is, therefore, exactly the change in the deadweight loss as a consequence of the innovation.24 DWL is a monotonic increasing function of the output difference Rc -Rm under perfect versus imperfect competition. Thus, since ARm < ARc, the benefit of a cost-reducing innovation is necessarily less under imperfect competition than under competition.
For the linear model depicted in figure 1, the increase in consumer surplus from the innovation is P DoD, Pm under imperfect competition versus WCBoB, W"c under perfect competition. Because AR, > ARm, price decreases more and consumers benefit more under perfect competition. The change in producer surplus under perfect competition is Rm > 0. Thus, the collective consumer and producer welfare benefit from a cost-reducing innovation is diminished under imperfect competition both because the total benefit is reduced by the increase in the deadweight loss and because processors capture part of the benefit that does exist.
Application of the Methodology to Taiwanese Tomato Processing
Taiwan undertook field trials of mechanical tomato harvesting beginning in 1989-90. The trials included introduction of new tomato cultivars from California that produced fruit amenable to mechanical harvesting. Data for this analysis were derived from the eleven participating farmers in 1990-91, the second year of field trials. The average yield attainable from the new cultivars was 70 metric tons (MT) per ha, about the same as that attained from conventional cultivars. Production costs were disaggregated into preharvest and harvest periods. Three harvest regimes were considered: total hand harvest, total machine harvest, and a combination of hand and machine harvest. A disadvantage to pure machine harvesting is that yields may be reduced relative to multiple hand-harvests because tomatoes are not uniformly ripe at the time of the single mechanical harvest.25 The Taiwanese trials all involved a hand harvest conducted two to three weeks before the mechanical harvest. In the 1990-91 trials 37% of the crop was harvested by hand, with the remaining 63% machine harvested.
The combination of hand and machine harvesting reduced both preharvest and harvest costs relative to pure hand-harvesting. Preharvest cost savings were primarily due to mechanical direct seeding and reduced fertilizer use. Machine harvest costs are primarily a function of the hectarage harvested, and the key factor in achieving harvest cost savings under a switch to machine harvesting is the yield relative to pure hand-harvesting. Table 3 reports preharvest and harvest cost results based on the field trials. Strategy S,, a combination hand-machine harvesting, reduced production costs 28% relative to the baseline strategy, So, of pure hand-harvest. The major adaptation distinguishing the Taiwan application from the general welfare evaluation methodology described previously is the presence of the elastic export demand, which results in the domestic price for processed tomato products, PD, being unchanged despite adoption of the harvester. Processor behavior in selling tomato products involves equating perceived marginal revenue from domestic market sales with the exogenous export price PE. Any additional sales in the domestic market causes perceived marginal revenue to fall below PE, meaning that the entire output expansion, AR, under either perfect or imperfect competition will be exported and benefit to domestic consumers from adoption of the harvester will be zero. This result does not, however, hold generally as figure 1 indicates. Rather, consumers benefit from cost-reducing innovations whenever demand slopes downward in all market outlets for the finished product(s).26
Given that the domestic sales and tomatoproduct prices facing Taiwanese processors do not change as a consequence of mechanical harvesting, the change in processor profits from innovation in the supply of R can be expressed 26 The conceptual framework summarized in figure  1 Under each of the mechanical harvesting scenarios, processors' collective benefit exceeds the benefit accruing to farmers. The total annual benefit to adopting a combination handmachine harvest was estimated to be NT$167 million (approximately U.S.$6.17 million). Given projected post-harvester hectarage of 4,414 and 70 MT yield, the benefit is roughly U.S.$20 per MT, with processors capturing 55.1% of that amount. In evaluating the efficacy of adopting the harvester in Taiwan, this annual stream of benefits must be discounted and compared to the fixed costs of adapting fields and roads to accommodate mechanical harvesting. No comprehensive study of these costs has been made, but they are unlikely to surpass the estimated benefit flow, suggesting that mechanical tomato harvesting is indeed beneficial for Taiwan and represents a possible avenue to enhance the international competitiveness of the industry.27 Table 5 compares the benefits to mechanical harvesting based on the model of imperfect competition with benefits calculated assuming that the industry is perfectly competitive. Estimation of the supply and demand equations, (6') and (7'), is unaffected by the market structure because those relationships were estimated at the primary levels where behavior is unequivocally competitive.28 Thus, estimated benefits from mechanical harvesting under perfect competition within the present model can be obtained simply by setting 0 = ? = 0. The result is AW = 0 from equation (12) and, hence An = 0 from equation (14). Benefits under perfect competition accrue solely to farmers and are estimated using equations (9) and (11) to compute the change in producer surplus, given AW = 0. Table 5 indicates that about 25% of the benefits from mechanical harvesting are lost due to imperfect competition under any of the harvest strategies. The loss to producers is much more dramatic-equaling about two-thirds of the benefits attainable under perfect competition in procurement of raw tomatoes. From a welfare perspective, these estimates illustrate the proportion of benefits from a cost-reducing innovation that can be lost due to imperfect competition. From a behavioral perspective, they illustrate the magnitude of error in benefit estimation that may accrue from incorrectly assuming perfect competition in an industry that is in fact oligopsonistic. Consumer benefits to the innovation disappear in our model due to Taiwan's relationship to the export market for tomato products. However, such benefits will exist in many applications and also be diminished by imperfect competition, as figure 1 illustrates.
Conclusions
In this paper we have developed and applied a conceptual framework to evaluate the impacts of a cost-reducing innovation in an imperfectly competitive market for an agricultural product. The methodology applies generally to oligopolistic and/or oligopsonistic markets and includes perfect competition and monopoly/ monopsony as special cases. Previous work on returns to research and product innovations has generally assumed perfect competition. This study demonstrates that serious errors in the estimation of the magnitude and distribution of benefits are possible when an imperfectly competitive market is erroneously modeled as perfectly competitive. In general, the benefits of a cost-reducing innovation are less under imperfect competition than perfect competition because the output expansion is relatively muted by the conduct of imperfectly competitive firms. In addition, marketing firms as a class of agents derive benefits from the innovation as imperfect competitors that they would not obtain as perfect competitors under a constant returns marketing/processing technology.
Application of the model to mechanical tomato harvesting in Taiwan revealed first that the industry is imperfectly competitive both in raw-product procurement and domestic product sales. Field trials indicated the potential of mechanical harvesting to reduce processing tomato per unit production costs from 12% to 45%, depending upon the machine harvest yield. Consumers in Taiwan were shown not to benefit from mechanical harvesting because additional production will flow into the export market where Taiwan is a perfect competitor. Further, the benefit will be shared by farmers and processors, with the latter receiving about 55% of the total, based upon the study results. Conversely, under perfect competition, benefits from the innovation would accrue to farmers only. The loss to farmers from oligopsony in tomato procurement was estimated to be about twothirds of the benefits attainable under perfect competition, with the overall loss due to imperfect competition estimated to be 25% of the benefits attainable under perfect competition.
Aside from its importance in obtaining accurate estimates of research/innovation benefits, estimating and working with the appropriate market model can have considerable policy relevance, as the present application illustrates. With the processing sector poised to obtain 55% of the benefits from mechanical harvesting, the sector collectively has incentive to facilitate farmers' adoption of mechanical harvesting. An obvious avenue for processor assistance would be sharing in the costs of modifying fields and roads to accommodate mechanical harvesters. However, free-riding may well prevent such assistance from emerging in the absence of government policies to address and internalize the spillover effects. This market failure may explain in part why mechanical harvesting has not been adopted in Taiwan despite the apparent benefits it would generate.
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